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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Soft Corporation is a leading maker of software and operating 
systems.  It undertakes great measures to protect the secrecy of its new 
products under development, plans to launch new products, technical 
product specifications, and product source codes, all of which it considers 
company trade secrets.  A disgruntled employee, John Sneaky, one of the 
few persons with access to the source code to Soft’s soon to be released 
operating system, Win100, posts the source code (labeled “Confidential – 
Soft Proprietary Information”) on a members-only website critical of Soft, 
Softsucks.com.   
Soft discovers the posting within six hours of its appearing on the 
site, and after informing the site operator that the information is a stolen 
Soft trade secret, it is immediately removed.  Prior to its removal, however, 
Sam Quickbuck, had downloaded the source code.  When he realized, the 
next day that the source code was no longer available on Softsucks.com he 
decided to capitalize on the opportunity.   
He posted a notice on his web site offering the code for sale: 
“Win100 source code, original, (jacked from inside) available for sale.  Get 
it here before it’s even released and stick it to Soft.  If you wanna buy it 
($50) I’ll give you a password to download it.”    
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Soft sues Quickbuck  for misappropriation of trade secrets, seeking a 
preliminary injunction to prohibit his use and sale of the source code.  After 
a hearing, the court denies relief to Soft, reasoning that despite Soft’s best 
efforts to keep the source code secret, it has lost its trade secret status by 
virtue of it appearing on the Internet, and that Quickbuck cannot be 
enjoined from using it. Soft now faces widespread use of its source code by 
other competitors and a resulting loss of market share for its Win100 
operating system.  As a result of the ruling, it can no longer claim the source 
code as a trade secret. 
This hypothetical1 introduces the problem and accompanying 
questions tackled by this Article.  When, for instance, an employee 
discloses an employer’s trade secrets to the public over the Internet, does 
our current trade secret framework appropriately address the consequences 
of that disclosure?  What ought to be the rule which governs whether the 
trade secret owner has lost not only the protection status for the secret, but 
any remedies against use by third parties?  Should the ease with which the 
Internet permits instant and mass disclosure of secrets be taken into 
consideration in assessing the fairness of a rule which calls for immediate 
loss of the trade secret upon disclosure?   
 
1 This hypothetical is loosely based on United States v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D. N.Y. 2005) 
(discussed infra at sections III(C) and VIII(B)(4).  
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A.  The Power of the Internet 
 
Although trade secret owners have always risked disclosure of their 
highly sensitive and confidential information, today the Internet magnifies 
that risk exponentially.2 It facilitates complete destruction of a trade secret 
in an instant, and the law strips the trade secret owner’s power to control or 
contain the damage.  Even when the party posting3 the information may not 
have intended to cause harm to the trade secret owner, the injury can be no 
less devastating.4 One court, while refusing to enjoin publication of a 
company’s trade secrets on First Amendment grounds, nevertheless noted 
the shift in balance of power made possible by the Internet: “[w]ith the 
Internet, significant leverage is gained by the gadfy, who has no editor 
looking over his shoulder and no professional ethics to constrain him.  
Technology blurs the traditional identities of David and Goliath.”5
2 The Internet has become an important part of daily life, connecting approximately 800 million people to a 
global network.  See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen and Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property Right, 56 
Hastings L.J. 1, 4 (2004).  Over fifty percent of all households are connected to the Internet.  See Daniel W. Park, 
Trade Secrets, The First Amendment, and Patent Law: A Collision on the Information Superhighway, 10 Stan. J. 
L. Bus. & Fin. 46, 47 (2004).  Its presence has changed the way in which the world does business and its impact 
on the economy is far reaching.  See generally  Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Symposium: Personal Jurisdiction In The 
Internet Age: Of Nodes And Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach To Internet Jurisdiction Through Data 
Privacy, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 493, 499 (2004) (discussing trends in the Internet economy). 
 
3 This Article often refers to trade secret information being posted on the Internet.  Posting “consists of 
directly placing material on or in a Web site, bulletin board, discussion group, newsgroup, or similar Internet site 
or ‘forum,’ where it will appear automatically and more or less immediately to be seen by anyone with access to 
that forum.”  O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 WL 1452685 at *13 (Cal. App. May 26, 
2006).  It therefore allows direct self-publication of information, or one may also send information to a site, the 
owners or moderators of which make decisions about what to post.  See id. at *13-14 
4 See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2005)(holding that FDA 
could be liable for misappropriation of trade secrets where it posted plaintiff’s trade secrets on its website for five 
months).   
 
5 Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d  745, 753-54 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
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Unlike other mass media which generally have staff who decide 
what materials will be published, the Internet has no such filter.  Any person 
sitting at a computer may post information onto the Internet, resulting in 
immediate and irreparable harm.  One judge captured the problem in these 
words: 
The court is troubled by the notion that any Internet user . . . 
can destroy valuable intellectual property rights by posting 
them over the Internet, especially given the fact that there is 
little opportunity to screen postings before they are made . . . 
Nonetheless, one of the Internet’s virtues, that it gives even 
the poorest individuals the power to publish to millions of 
readers . . . can also be a detriment to the value of intellectual 
property rights.  The anonymous (or judgment proof) 
defendant can permanently destroy valuable trade secrets, 
leaving no one to hold liable for misappropriation.6
The power of the Internet has added complexity to the archetypal two 
person misappropriation framework traditionally encountered in trade secret 
law.  Misappropriation claims often arise in an employment context, for 
instance, where an employee leaves for new employment with a competitor 
and takes the former employer’s trade secrets.  The employer, trade secret 
owner, can state misappropriation claims against the former employee, and 
often the new employer.7 In the case of an Internet disclosure, however, the 
current law suggests that there is no claim against the third parties who 
 
6 Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communications Servs., Inc.., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 
7 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe,  When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable 
Disclosure Doctrine , 7 Tul. J. Technology. & Intell. Prop. 167, 176-77 (2005). 
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discover the information, and thus no feasible way to contain the 
dissemination of the trade secret.  
B.  Legal Complications 
 
Further complicating the situation is that trade secret law only 
protects secret information.  Consistent with that framework, it is therefore 
difficult to argue that information which appears on the World Wide Web, 
and which is admittedly no longer secret, can retain trade secret protection.  
Yet, trade secret law is also equitable, and intended to regulate the morality 
of the business world.  Why then should we create incentives for 
inappropriate and unethical conduct, by permitting a single individual’s 
disclosure of a trade secret to destroy that which has been so well guarded 
by a trade secret owner?  A sound analysis of this complicated problem 
calls for a balancing of the right of the trade secret owner to preserve its 
trade secret information, the right of an innocent independent third party to 
use information found in the public domain, and the policies favoring fair 
competition. 
A view from outside trade secret law also provides guidance for and 
against the case for retention of trade secret status after an Internet 
disclosure.  On one hand, constitutional law and patent law considerations 
lean toward prohibiting restrictions on the use of publicly available 
information.  On the other hand, attorney client privilege cases, in 
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analogous circumstances support preservation.  Some of these areas of law 
provide further insight into analogous incentives for wrongdoing.  
C.  The Article’s Mission 
 
Several commentators have identified the general problem posed by 
trade secret disclosures over the Internet, but none have analyzed the 
problem with the same depth and approach used in this Article.8 Moreover, 
much of the literature addresses First Amendment challenges, with top 
scholars arguing from both ends of the spectrum about the role of the First 
Amendment in trade secret cases.9 I enter the discussion from a different 
perspective, (ultimately landing somewhere near the middle of the spectrum 
between those who would extend broad First Amendment protection to 
anyone who posts trade secrets on the Internet and those who would protect 
the status of trade secrets over First Amendment and Internet challenges).  
 
8 See, e.g., Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law 
Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151, 1182-83 (1996); Matthew R. Millikin, Note: 
WWW.Misappropriation.com: Protecting Trade Secrets After Mass Dissemination on the Internet, 78 Wash. U. L. 
Q. 931 (2000); Ryan Lambrecht, Note: Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the 
Information Age?, 18 Rev. Litig. 317 (1999); Daniel W. Park, Trade Secrets, The First Amendment, and Patent 
Law: A Collision on the Information Superhighway, 10 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 46, 47 (2004); Victoria A. Cundiff, 
Trade Secrets and The Internet: Preventing The Internet From Being An Instrument of Destruction, 842 PLI/PAT 
347, 355-59 (2005). 
 
9 For those favoring trade secret protection over First Amendment rights see, e.g., Bruce T. Adkins, 
Trading Secrets In the Information Age:  Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151; 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property:  The Clash Between Intellectual Property 
and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media, & Ent. L.J. 1, 5 
(2001); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment:  The Dangers of First Amendment 
Exceptionalism, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1003 (2000); Franklin B. Goldberg, Recent Developments: Ford Motor Co. v. 
Lane, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 271 (2001); Adam W. Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the Internet Age:  The Battle 
Between Free Speech and Trade Secrets, 54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 517 (2002).   
For those advocating First Amendment rights over trade secret protection, see, e.g., David Greene, Trade 
Secrets, the First Amendment, and the Challenges of the Internet Age, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 537 
(2001); Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases,
48 Duke L.J. 147, 229-31 (1999); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property:  Some Thoughts 
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Houston L. Rev. 697, 739-48 (2003).     
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My objective is to articulate a workable test that courts can use 
when deciding whether trade secrets that have been disclosed on the 
Internet can still be preserved as secret, regardless of whether there is or is 
not a First Amendment defense in the case.  The Article critically examines 
relevant trade secret doctrines, dissecting assumptions and methodically 
examining whether it is possible to retain trade secret protection in the face 
of a disclosure over the Internet.  It also draws guidance from other areas of 
law, and together this critical examination informs what I coin a sequential 
preservation model.  Accordingly, this model is a unique and novel 
approach to the problem.10 
The sequential preservation model calls for a threshold 
determination of whether the information was entitled to trade secret 
protection before the Internet disclosure.  If and only if it was, then a three 
factor test will be used to evaluate whether it retained the trade secret status, 
and was ultimately misappropriated.  Those three factors consider (1) the 
amount of time the information was exposed on the Internet and the 
promptness of any action by the trade secret owner to have the information 
 
10 Attempts to address the problem effectively must take into consideration the various issues identified 
in this paper, and tread a delicate balance, being ever mindful of the goals and constraints of trade secret law and 
its interaction with other areas of law.  To do otherwise may risk undermining the general principles of trade 
secret law.  The state of Nevada, for instance, enacted legislation in 2001 which provides that a trade secret that is 
disseminated on the Internet shall remain a trade secret if the owner obtains an injunction to have it removed 
within a “reasonable time.” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600A.055 (2005). For a host of reasons discussed, infra, this 
legislation is not well grounded.  See sections V, VI, and VIII infra. 
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removed, (2) the extent of the disclosure, and (3) the likelihood that the 
recipient knew the information was trade secret. 
 Part II of the Article provides a background summary of trade 
secret law.  Part III summarizes the relevant case law in this area.  Part IV 
analyzes the third party disclosure problem.  Insights from other areas of 
law are provided in Parts V and VI.  Part VII presents the proposed model 
and the three factor test for analyzing these cases, followed by a theoretical 
summary and application of the model in Part VIII.  Part IX addresses 
remedies available to a trade secret owner, and the Article concludes in Part 
X. 
II. TRADE SECRET LAW BACKGROUND 
Unlike the other areas of intellectual property (copyrights, patents, 
and trademarks), there is no federal statutory law governing trade secrets.  
Rather, trade secrets are protected by state law.  Most states have adopted 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), and as a result there is some 
uniformity in defining trade secrets and trade secret misappropriation.11 
The states that have not adopted the UTSA tend to rely on common law 
based on the Restatement of Torts.12 Finally, and more recently, the 
 
11 It  has been adopted in whole or part by forty-four states and Washington, D.C.   
 
12 See Michael A. Epstein, Epstein on Intellectual Property, (4th ed.), 2005 Supplement, § 1.02 at 1-4. 
 
The UTSA provides broader protection than the Restatement in that it does not require that a trade 
secret be in use to be protected, and it protects negative information.  A negative trade secret is the knowledge of 
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Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition13 also addresses trade secrets.14 
Its rules apply to actions under both the UTSA and the Restatement of 
Torts.15 Most courts appear to rely on the definitions in the UTSA16 or in 
the Restatement of Torts,17 and as such this Article will as well for most of 
the analysis which follows. 
 
what not to do or what doesn’t work, a lesson learned from a certain process or research and development effort 
that failed.  See James Pooley, Trade Secrets 4.02 [3] (1997).   
 
13 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39-45 (1995). 
 
14 This is an interesting shift in the overall treatment of this area of the law and it corresponds with the 
growing union of trade secret and unfair competition issues becoming evident in the case law. For instance, unfair 
competition claims involving trade secrets often mirror trade secret misappropriation claims.  See, e.g., IBM v. 
Seagate, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20406, at *11 (D. Minn. 1991; GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O’Neill, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1229 
(D. Cal. 2001). 
 
15 See  Restatement of Unfair Competition § 39, Reporters’ Note (1995).   
 
16 The UTSA defines a trade secret as information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique or process, that: (a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.  Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).   
The UTSA requires only reasonable efforts, not all conceivable efforts, to protect the confidentiality of 
trade secrets.  See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1987).  See also Religious Tech. 
Ctr. V. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv. Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (church made 
reasonable efforts under UTSA to protect secrecy of religious documents, including: use of locked cabinets and 
safes; logging in identification of materials; electronic sensors; alarms; photo identifications; security personnel; 
and confidentiality agreements for all given access to materials). 
 
17 See Michael A. Epstein, Epstein on Intellectual Property, (4th ed.), 2005 Supplement, § 1.02 at 1-4 
 The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as any formula, pattern, device or compilation of 
information, which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it. Restatement (First) of Torts, § 757, cmt. (b) (1939),  It may be a formula 
for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or 
other device, or a list of customers. Id. 
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A.  Lawful Use of Another’s Trade Secrets 
 
Unlike patent law which grants exclusive use to a patent holder, the 
owner of a trade secret does not enjoy the same level of exclusivity.18 Not 
only can the same information be considered a trade secret by more than 
one owner, but not all use of a trade secret is an unlawful 
misappropriation.19 Rather, only trade secrets that have been acquired 
through improper discovery are unlawful.20 A trade secret owner may 
grant permission to use a trade secret.  Even without consent or permission, 
however, a party may make lawful use of another’s trade secrets in three 
main ways.   
First, one who independently discovers or invents a trade secret is 
entitled to use it.21 Second, one who actually reverse engineers a trade 
secret (obtained fairly and honestly) is not subject to liability for trade 
secret misappropriation.22 Finally, and most relevant to this Article, where 
a party learns a trade secret through a disclosure that was not made in 
 
18 See Junker v. Plummer, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Mass. 1946) (“The owner of a trade secret, in 
contradistinction to the owner of a patent, has no such right in the idea as will enable him to exclude others from 
using it.  Thus if one acquires a secret by honest means he may use it.” (citations omitted)).  
 
19 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 
F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 
20 See Kewanee., 416 U.S. at  496-97. 
 
21 Id. at 476. 
 
22 See, e.g., Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982) (locksmiths may reverse engineer 
codes and then provide them for compilation); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953) (“It is 
unquestionably lawful for a person to gain possession, through proper means, of his competitor’s product and, 
through inspection and analysis, create a duplicate, unless, of course the item, is patented.”);  Unif. Trade Secrets 
Act, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (Commissioners’ Comment).  
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breach of a contract or special relationship or with knowledge of such a 
breach, she is entitled to use it.23 Thus, a trade secret owner has no 
protection for a trade secret that is accidentally disclosed.24 Of even greater 
significance is that once disclosed, the trade secret no longer exists as to 
other parties because the requisite level of secrecy cannot be met.25 
B.  Equitable Nature of Trade Secret Law 
 
Trade secret law is the branch of intellectual property law that most 
closely regulates standards of commercial ethics, guides morality of the 
business world, and underscores fair dealing.26 It is probably in part for this 
reason that trade secret law is now codified in the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition rather than in the Restatement of Torts.27 Its equitable nature 
is evident in most court opinions, as judges struggle to decide that which is 
 
23 See Restatement (First) of Torts  § 757, cmt. a. (1939). 
 
24 See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 196 (1st Cir. 1980) (“even a 
bona fide trade secret is not protected against discovery by fair means, including accidental disclosure”).  
 
25 See Lockridge v. Tweco Products, Inc., 209 Kan. 389, 393 (1972) (“Once the secret is published to the 
‘whole world,’ . . . it loses its protected status and becomes available to others for use and copying without fear of 
legal reprisal from the original possessor.”) 
 
26 See, e.g., 416 U.S. at 481-82; Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law 1.05, at 1-15 (1997); Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition 39 cmt. A (1995).  
 
27 Although the precise reason for this change is not explicitly stated, perhaps it is because trade secret 
law is inextricably tied to the values of our competitive marketplace.  As the authors note, “the law of trade secrets 
. . . reflects the accommodation of numerous interests, including the trade secret owner's claim to protection 
against the defendant's bad faith or improper conduct, the right of competitors and others to exploit information 
and skills in the public domain, and the interest of the public in encouraging innovation and in securing the 
benefits of vigorous competition.”  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. b (1995).  See James J. 
Mulcahy and Joy M. Tassin,  Is PepsiCo the Choice of the Next Generation: The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
and its Place in New York Jurisprudence, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 233 (2003). 
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fair to the parties by assessing, sometimes impliedly, such elements as good 
faith, honesty, and fair dealing.28 
Consistent with these underlying ethical and equitable approaches, 
all three statutory frameworks of trade secret law described above prohibit 
the use of improper means to acquire trade secrets.29 This is not an 
insignificant fact, and should be crucial to analyzing the third party problem 
presented in this Article.  Thus, the extent to which acquisition of another’s 
trade secrets over the Internet involved “improper means”30 by both the 
original misappropriator and the third party user ought to be the central 
inquiry once the threshold question has been answered.  
 
28 See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The essence of the tort of 
trade secret misappropriation is the inequitable use of the secret”); see also Northern Petrochemical Co. v. 
Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 
29 Restatement (First) of Torts  § 757, cmt. a (1939).; Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 449.; 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 40 (1995). 
 
30 “Improper means” under the UTSA includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of 
a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
§ 1 (1985). 
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III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CASE LAW 
The cases below are representative of the trade secret disclosure 
problem.  They reflect the courts’ attempts to wrestle with the bright line 
rule against protecting non-secret information and the equitable 
considerations underlying trade secret law.  The cases also reveal the range 
of potential actors who could expose secrets, from insiders (like employees) 
to outsiders who purportedly are motivated by the public interest. 
 
A.  The Church of Scientology Cases 
 
In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma31, Lerma, a disgruntled 
former member of the Church of Scientology, published documents taken 
from a court record onto the Internet.32 The Church33 considered these 
documents to be trade secrets and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order 
prohibiting Lerma from publishing the alleged trade secrets.34 The Church 
also sued The Washington Post for publishing a story related to and quoting 
the allegedly trade secret documents.35 The court, granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Post on the trade secret misappropriation claims, 
 
31 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
 
32 Id. at 1364. 
 
33 The Religious Technology Center is a non-profit corporation formed by the Church of Scientology to 
protect it its religious course materials.  See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 823 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 
34 908 F. Supp. at 1364. 
35 908 F. Supp. at 1365.  The Post had obtained the documents from Lerma and from the court file. 
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reasoning in part that the documents no longer qualified as trade secrets.36 
The court was not moved by the fact that the church had taken extraordinary 
measures to keep the documents secret, including having a Church member 
sign out the court file on a daily basis.37 
In another Scientology case, the Church sought an injunction against 
another disgruntled former member who posted Church writings on several 
USENET groups.38 In examining the Church’s claim that the writings were 
trade secrets, the court stated that while the defendant could not rely on his 
own improper posting of the writings to the Internet to support the argument 
that the writings were no longer secrets, evidence that an unrelated third 
party posted them would result in a loss of secrecy and a loss of trade secret 
rights.39 The court held that since the writings were posted on the Internet, 
they were generally available to the relevant public and there was no trade 
secret right available to support an injunction.40 
In a motion six months later, the Church again sought an injunction 
on trade secret grounds, this time introducing consumer surveys to show 
 
36 Id. at 1369. 
 
37 Id. at 1365. 
 
38 Netcom, 823 F. Supp. at 1239. 
 
39 Id. at 1256. 
 
40 Id. at 1256-57. 
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that the writings were not generally known.41 The court struck the surveys 
as irrelevant because they were surveys of the general public and not of the 
Church’s competitors.42 However, the court retreated from its earlier 
statement that posting to the Internet destroys trade secret protection.43 
Instead, the court announced that a determination of trade secret protection 
“requires a review of the circumstances surrounding the posting and 
consideration of the interests of the trade secret owner, the policies favoring 
competition and the interests, including first amendment rights,[sic] of 
innocent third parties who acquire information off the Internet.”44 Because 
the trade secret status of the Church’s documents was an open question 
under this new test, the court granted a preliminary injunction.45 
B.  DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner 
 
In DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner,46 the plaintiff association 
developed an encryption program called CSS to limit the copying of DVD’s 
by DVD players and computers that could decrypt CSS.47 The plaintiff 
alleged that by reverse engineering plaintiff’s program, a Norwegian teen 
 
41 Religious technology Center v. Netcom, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, *24 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
 
42 Id. at *26. 
 
43 Id. at *40-*41. 
 
44 Id. at *41. 
 
45 Id. at *42. 
 
46 93 Cal.App.4th 648 (6th App. 2001). 
 
47 Id. at 652. 
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created a program called DeCSS that allowed encrypted DVD’s to be 
played on any DVD player or computer.48 Defendant Bunner found and 
posted that program on the Internet for anyone to use.49 The plaintiff filed a 
suit for injunctive relief to prevent Bunner from posting or linking to the 
DeCSS program on the Internet.50 The court noted that Bunner’s reverse 
engineering did not qualify as using improper means to acquire trade 
secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, but that Bunner disclosed 
trade secrets he knew or should have known were proprietary information.51 
However, the court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that it would 
be a prior restraint of pure speech.52 
The court held that traditional intellectual property exceptions to the 
prior restraint doctrine do not apply since Bunner did not actually use the 
information or breach a contractual obligation.53 After an appeal by the 
California Supreme Court, which held that an injunction would not violate 
the First Amendment if there was a trade secret,54 the court was asked on 
 
48 Id.  
 
49 Id. 
 
50 Id. at 653. 
 
51 Id. at 660. 
 
52 DVD Copy Control Assoc., 93 Cal.App.4th at 664. 
 
53 Id. 
 
54 DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 875 (2003). 
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remand to determine whether a trade secret still existed.55 The court noted 
that widespread publication of a trade secret over the Internet will destroy 
its status as a trade secret.56 However, the court went on further to reason 
that the information retains its value to the creator if the Internet publication 
is sufficiently obscure or transient so that it does not become generally 
known to those who would consider it valuable.57 The court rejected 
plaintiff’s public policy arguments for protecting trade secrets, holding that 
allowing injunctions once a trade secret has become public could 
theoretically put the entire general public at risk for liability.58 Since the 
trade secret had been widely disseminated, an injunction would not prevent 
any further harm from occurring to the plaintiff, so the court denied the 
injunction.59 
55 DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 116 Cal.App.4th 241, 245 (6th App. 2004). 
 
56 Id. at 251. 
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Id. at 253. 
 
59 Id. at 255. 
 
27-Aug-06]  SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES 20 
C.  United States v. Genovese 
 
In United States v. Genovese,60 defendant Genovese was charged 
with offering Microsoft source code for sale on the Internet in violation of 
the Economic Espionage Act of 199661 (“EEA”).62 Genovese challenged 
the indictment on the grounds that the statute, which makes downloading 
and selling a trade secret a crime, violated the First Amendment.63 The 
court noted that the First Amendment protects computer source code and 
other trade secrets, but held that the First Amendment does not protect 
conduct such as trying to convert a trade secret for economic gain.64 
Genovese also made a due process challenge arguing that criminalizing the 
download and sale of trade secrets under the statute was vague because he 
could not have known the source code was not generally known or that 
Microsoft took reasonable measures to protect it.65 However, the court held 
that under the EEA, a trade secret does not lose its protection when 
“temporarily, accidentally, or illicitly released to the public, provided it 
 
60 409 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D. N.Y. 2005). 
 
61 The Act provided the first comprehensive criminal federal trade secrets law on trade secret theft and 
misappropriation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (1996).  The EEA criminalizes “theft of trade secrets” Id. at § 1832(a).  
and economic espionage for the benefit of a foreign government, instrumentality or agent.  In order to state a 
claim under the Act for theft of trade secrets, the government must establish that the defendant knowingly stole, or 
obtained information that was trade secret without authorization. Id. at § 1832 (a). 
 
62 409 F. Supp. 2d at 254.  
 
63 Id. at 256.  
 
64 Id. at ¶8. 
 
65 Id. at ¶11. 
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does not become ‘generally known.’”66 The court observed that since 
Genovese sold the source code, it still retained some value and was not 
generally known.67 
IV. ANALYZING THE THIRD PARTY PROBLEM 
This Article tackles the problem which arises when an independent68 
third party discovers another’s trade secrets on the Internet and uses or 
intends to use it.  The trade secret owner has misappropriation claims 
against the original misappropriator.69 If the original misappropriator did 
not post the information himself, then whoever posted the information may 
also be liable.70 As against an independent third party who comes upon the 
 
66 Genovese, 409 F. Supp. at ¶12. 
 
67 Id. at ¶13. 
 
68 One who is independent of  and has no connection or involvement with the original misappropriator of 
the trade secret.  
 
69 The UTSA defines "misappropriation," as: 
 
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was 
acquired by improper means; or 
 
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who: 
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
 
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew, or had reason to know, that his knowledge of the trade secret was: 
(I) derived from, or through, a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; 
 
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or, 
 
(III) derived from, or through, a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or 
limit its use; or 
(C) before a material change of his position knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that 
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 449. 
70 To the extent one has exhibited discretion, akin to that of a magazine or newspaper publisher, in 
deciding to disclose a trade secret, then she may be liable.  O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 
WL 1452685 at *21 (Cal. App. May 26, 2006) (noting that disclosure of confidential information about a 
company may expose a reporter or editor to liability).  See also notes 222-225 and accompanying text infra. 
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information once posted, however, it is unclear whether the trade secret 
owner has any remedies under trade secret law to prevent use of the 
information.   
Indeed, the current status of trade secret law would suggest that the 
third party is entitled to use information she obtained from the public 
domain, assuming that she did not employ improper means to obtain the 
trade secret, has no knowledge that it was obtained by improper means, or is 
not bound by any contractual or special relationship with the trade secret 
owner.71 However, that initial conclusion necessarily makes several 
underlying assumptions about trade secret law and Internet publication.   
Among these assumptions are that (i) the information was not a 
trade secret at the time it was discovered (ii)  the fact that information 
appeared on the Internet makes it public, generally known, and readily 
ascertainable, and (iii) the discovery was not through improper means.   
This section will dissect each assumption to analyze whether it is reasonable 
to conclude that the trade secret owner is not likely to prevail against an 
independent third party either because the information was not trade secret 
at the time it reached the third party or because even if the information is 
determined to be trade secret it was not misappropriated by the third party.  
 
71 See Lockridge v. Tweco Products, Inc., 209 Kan. 389, 393 (1972)(reasoning that there can be no 
recovery against  those who are “not misappropriators in the first instance, or possessors of the secret by virtue of 
learning it from the misappropriator(s) with knowledge that it was stolen.”)  
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The succeeding two sections will then turn for guidance to a broader view 
outside of trade secret law, followed by the proposed model.  
 
A.  Is it a trade secret? 
 
The first hurdle, and first step, to a trade secret owner whose 
proprietary information has been discovered on the Internet, is proving that 
the information has not lost its trade secret status by virtue of its publication 
in this medium.  While in the typical misappropriation case a trade secret 
owner must prove that the information is the type of information that is 
protectable under trade secret law, and that she took reasonable steps to 
maintain its secrecy, the Internet publication problem presented here is 
complicated by additional layers of proof.  This is primarily because the 
third party (vis a vis, for instance, a former employee who discloses an 
employer’s trade secrets) would not be breaching any contract or duty to the 
trade secret owner, and would have discovered the information in an 
arguably public place.72 
Given the factual scenario presented here, the relevant applicable 
requirements from the UTSA’s73 definition of trade secret are that the 
 
72 In cases where the information has previously or simultaneously become available by other means 
other than the Internet, it makes it even more difficult for the trade secret owner to attempt to argue that it should 
be protected.  See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1526 (D. Colo. 
1995) (noting that the information had been available in an unsealed court file). 
 
73 I rely on the UTSA because it has been adopted by a majority of the states, and because it’s trade 
secret definition is consistent with both the Rest. of Torts and the Rest. of Unfair Competition definitions. 
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information (i) not be generally known and (ii) not be readily ascertainable 
by proper means.74 This leads to further inquiry as to whether a posting on 
the Internet is “generally known” and “readily ascertainable” and whether 
locating such information via the Internet constitutes “proper means.”   
Because of the nature of the Internet, and the relatively unique (to 
trade secret law) problem presented in this Article, it is important to identify 
the accurate point in time at which the trade secret status of the information 
should be determined,  and the party from whose perspective the relevant 
inquiry should be made.  One possibility is to consider whether at the time 
the defendant (independent third party) came upon the information, it was a 
trade secret.  Another option is to consider whether the information was 
trade secret before it was misappropriated by the wrongdoer.  The former is 
a pre-misappropriation perspective, while the latter is a post-
misappropriation perspective.  The post-misappropriation perspective seems 
more consistent with trade secret law and the manner in which 
misappropriation cases are generally analyzed.  To be sure, it is not the 
more favorable perspective for a trade secret owner, because it lends itself 
to a more ephemeral view of trade secrets, where despite a trade secret 
 
74 UTSA § 1 
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owner’s best efforts it may lose trade secret protection due to the 
intervening acts of a bad actor.75 
Although the additional layer presented here, of an independent 
third party discovering information on the Internet from a misappropriator, 
is missing from the typical two-party trade secret case, there does not seem 
to be sufficient reason to diverge from the same analysis.  In other words, in 
a situation where an employee steals an employer’s trade secrets we would 
ask whether the information was trade secret at the time the employee took 
possession of it.  Similarly, with an independent third party, it seems logical 
to consider whether at the time she discovered the information it was a trade 
secret.  Put in criminal terminology, in order to be guilty of stealing a trade 
secret, the information must have been a trade secret at the time in which 
the defendant came in possession of it.    
 
75 See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 901 (Cal. 2003) (Moreno, J. 
concurring) (“[E]ven when a trade secret holder acts with perfect diligence, it has no action against the republisher 
of no-longer-secret information who does not act in privity with the original misappropriator.”). 
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1. Is a Posting on the Internet “Generally Known”? 
 
It is axiomatic that publicly available information cannot qualify for 
trade secret status.76 Given our understanding of the Internet, it has become 
an implicit assumption that any information posted on the Internet77 is 
public.78 “[T]he act of ‘posting’ constitutes publication to the world.”79 If 
“generally known” is synonymous with public, then it might explain why 
many courts assume that a trade secret posted on the Internet has become 
generally known.  However, exploration below the surface of these 
assumptions merely leads to further questions.  For instance, does it matter 
if the information is “known” or “knowable” to competitors?  Does public 
mean public accessibility or public publication?  Does the obscurity of the 
website matter, or are all Internet postings equal?  An attempt to answer 
these questions will be forthcoming after we further dissect the legal 
definition of a trade secret.  
 
76 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Information that is public knowledge 
or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Copr., 416 U.S. 
470, 475 (1974) (“The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a 
general knowledge in the trade or business.”). 
 
77 Note that in some circumstances there can be various levels of access to a website, ranging from 
publicly available portions to those that are restricted to authorized users with passwords.  However, this 
discussion assumes an independent third party has accessed information from a publicly available site, or 
legitimately through a more restrictive site.  See, e.g., Inventory Locator Service, LLC v. Partsbase, Inc., No. 02-
2695MA/V, 2005 WL 2179185, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 6, 2005) (discussing a website with four levels of 
access). 
 
78 See generally Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2006) (Internet 
publication is form of “aggregate communication” intended for broad public audience similar to print media); 
Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, (D.C.Cir.2005) (trade secrets posted on 
FDA website available to public); Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2003) (when people 
post information to website available to public, they distribute it). 
 
79 O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 WL 1452685 at *13 (Cal. App. May 26, 2006). 
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The comments to the UTSA provide guidance in that they make 
clear that “generally known” does not necessarily mean known by the 
general public. 80 Indeed, a trade secret can be “generally known” if it is 
known by at least one person who can obtain economic benefit from the 
information.81 It would therefore seem more precise to say that information 
cannot be a trade secret if it is known (delete “generally”) by the relevant 
people82 (i.e. those who may benefit from it).83 Accordingly, it is difficult 
to challenge the emergent conclusion that “posting works to the Internet 
makes them ‘generally known’ to the relevant people.”84 Even though that 
conclusion makes legal sense, from an equitable perspective, it seems unfair 
to a trade secret owner that illegal conduct by another could destroy a 
heretofore well preserved trade secret.   
The case law demonstrates courts’ uneasiness with a bright line rule 
in that area, implying to this author the courts’ instinctive, albeit unstated, 
concern for fairness and the equitable nature of trade secret law.  One trial 
court, concerned about the incentives to wrongdoers, found that the mere 
 
80 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. (1990).  
 
81 Id. 
 
82 This does not include people to whom the trade secret owner has disclosed the trade secret pursuant to 
a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement. 
 
83 See Religious Technology Ctr. v.. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23572, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1997); DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc. v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93  
(2004). 
 
84 RTC v. Netcom, 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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posting of information on the Internet does not destroy a trade secret.85 
According to the court, “[t]o hold otherwise would do nothing less than 
encourage misappropriaters [sic] of trade secrets to post the fruits of their 
wrongdoing on the Internet as quickly as possible and as widely as possible 
thereby destroying a trade secret forever.”86 
Another court was willing to recognize that a publication on the 
Internet does not automatically terminate the existence of a trade secret, and 
considered the amount of time the information was posted and thus 
available for inspection.  To that court, where the posting is  “sufficiently 
obscure or transient or otherwise limited so that it does not become 
generally known to the relevant people, i.e., potential competitors or other 
persons to whom the information would have some economic value” the 
trade secret status is preserved.87 The precise measure of obscurity or 
transience required to protect the trade secret, however, is unsettled. 
In the Religious Technology Center cases, one of the courts noted 
that the fact that the information had been posted on the Internet for ten 
days, made it publicly available (destroying trade secret protection) because 
during those ten days they were potentially available to millions of Internet 
 
85 See Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241. 
 
86 Id. at 249. 
 
87 Id. at  251. 
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users.88 According to that court, “[o]nce a trade secret is posted on the 
Internet, it is effectively part of the public domain, impossible to retrieve.”89 
In another one of those related cases, the court was wary of making the 
“overly broad generalization” that posting works to the Internet would 
destroy their trade secret status.90 Instead, the court recommended 
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the posting.91 The model 
presented here espouses precisely that kind of review of the factual 
circumstances in an attempt to decide on a case by case basis whether, 
among other things, the generally known standard has been met. 
2. Is a Posting on the Internet “Readily Ascertainable”? 
 
It is interesting that the drafters of the UTSA chose a conjunctive 
between “generally known” and “readily ascertainable.”  This necessarily 
implies that they have separate meaning.  However, in practice courts seem 
to struggle with the difficulty of determining the meaning of these labels,92 
and more often simply do not consider the readily ascertainable prong as a 
separate factor but instead appear to collapse it into the generally known 
 
88 Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995).  
 
89 Id. at 1368. 
 
90 RTC v. Netcom, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1997). 
 
91 Id. 
 
92 See, e.g., U.S. v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp.2d 623, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“What is ‘generally known’ and 
‘reasonably ascertainable’ about ideas, concepts, and technology is constantly evolving in the modern age”); see 
also MicroStrategy Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp.2d 396, 417 (E.D. Va. 2004)(“What constitutes 
readily ascertainable through proper means is heavily fact dependent and simply boils down to assessing the ease 
with which a trade secret could have been independently discovered”). 
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prong.  Indeed, some states that have adopted the UTSA have chosen to 
remove “readily ascertainable” altogether from their definition of trade 
secret.93 Even without this trend, under the circumstances presented here 
attempting to satisfy both “generally known” and “readily ascertainable” 
does appear redundant.  Given the nature of the Internet the meanings may 
converge, and one could posit that every Internet posting is generally 
known and readily ascertainable, or is generally available and thus readily 
ascertainable.  
In the context of the Internet, treating the two concepts the same 
does not appear problematic.  The very nature of the Internet, that it allows 
equal access to anyone with a computer, irrespective of certain traditional 
limitations to accessing information, like geography and cost, means that it 
makes information at least readily discoverable, if not ascertainable.94 
Moreover, considering that the relevant population consists of those who 
could obtain economic benefit from the information, it is logical that these 
arguably motivated individuals would be the very persons surfing the 
Internet for information that would afford them a competitive advantage.   
 
93 See, e.g., Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d)(2), cmt re 1984 addition (West 1997) (explaining that the 
phrase was removed because it was “viewed as ambiguous in the definition of of a trade secret,” but that “the 
assertion that a matter is readily ascertainable by proper means remains available as a defense to a claim of 
misappropriation.”). 
 
94 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed. 2000)  
defines ascertainable as “to discover with certainty, as through examination or experimentation.’ 
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Earlier in this section I posed certain questions which, by virtue of 
having dissected the definition of trade secret in the context of the Internet, 
may now be easier to answer.  First, if courts continue to treat “generally 
known” and “readily ascertainable” interchangeably, then it does not seem 
to make a significant difference whether the information is “known” or 
“knowable” to competitors.  The former would fall under the “generally 
known” category, and the latter, i.e., whether it is knowable would be 
captured under the “readily ascertainable” category.    
The practical reality may be that the information will be known by 
at least one person, typically the named defendant in the law suit.  That 
defendant will likely argue that the information is not trade secret because 
the nature of the Internet is such that others have very likely accessed the 
information as well.  This raises another interesting question as to whether it 
is the trade secret owner’s burden of production to show that others have 
not accessed the information, or the defendant’s to show the opposite.  If 
posting information on the Internet makes it discoverable by and thus 
knowable to the relevant public, then the mere fact that the information is 
accessible to others may be sufficient to destroy secrecy even without proof 
of direct knowledge or access.  Accordingly, even when the trade secret 
owner does not necessarily know whether any specific competitors or others 
have accessed the information it may nonetheless have lost trade secret 
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protection.  This approaches the bright line rule that publication in and of 
itself extinguishes the trade secret.   
In further response to the questions posed, as between public 
accessibility and public publication the inquiry is the same, and indeed, in 
the context of the Internet may be one and the same.  A posting on the 
Internet, compared to, for instance, a disclosure in a report sitting on an 
office shelf,95 is both a publication96 and a publicly accessible publication.  
Thus, to the extent, generally known and readily ascertainable are 
synonymous, then the mere publication of a trade secret on the Internet and 
its ensuing accessibility would destroy the secret.   
Finally, the many angles of the analysis seem to lead to the 
inexorable conclusion that a posting on the Internet would most likely 
defeat any trade secret protection.  However, this may be true only if one 
accepts that all Internet postings are created equal.  If, however, 
consideration of the obscurity of or accessibility to the website as well as 
timing and amount of exposure effect the “generally known” or “readily 
ascertainable” prongs, then perhaps a different conclusion might be 
 
95 Such a report is arguably not publicly accessible.  Cf. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(finding in a patent case that a thesis in a college library that was not indexed or catalogued was not sufficiently 
publicly accessible to constitute a published prior art reference.)  
 
96 See, e.g., O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 WL 1452685 at *24-25 (Cal. App. 
May 26, 2006) (analyzing why Internet web sites are publications). 
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possible.  The factors presented later in this paper attempt to accommodate 
this possibility.  
 
B.  Is it Misappropriation? 
 
Having proved that the information is trade secret, or likely to be 
trade secret, the second hurdle to a trade secret owner whose proprietary 
information has been discovered on the Internet, is proving 
misappropriation.   This is difficult because on the surface the presence of 
the independent third party who has no duty to the trade secret owner to 
maintain his secret coupled with the public place discovery does not seem 
actionable.  The view that any wrong to a trade secret owner occurs only at 
the time of the improper acquisition stems from an underlying construct of 
trade secret law that does not treat a trade secret as property.97 Rather, the 
presence of a confidential relationship or good faith is a necessary 
prerequisite, and it is that breach that triggers something akin to an 
enforceable property right in the trade secret.98 The key factors then appear 
to be whether the information was discovered by improper means and 
whether the third party should have known it was discovered by improper 
means.  
 
97 The Restatement of Torts rejects the concept of a property interest in a trade secret, grounding trade 
secret protection on a general duty of good faith.  Restatement of Torts 757 cmt. a (1939). 
 
98 See Lockridge, 209 Kan. at 395-96 (discussing why the misappropriation of trade secret is not a 
continuing wrong). 
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All three trade secret statutory frameworks include improper means 
in defining misappropriation.99 The relevant provision from the UTSA 
appears to make a third party liable for misappropriation if he or she “knew 
or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret was 
derived from one who used improper means to acquire it. . .”100 This 
necessarily suggests a fact intensive determination into the third party’s 
state of mind, her level of knowledge that the information was trade secret 
and that it was acquired by improper means.   
With respect to third parties, not only does the Restatement of Torts 
define misappropriation to include a notice requirement when disclosure is 
intentional, but also when the disclosure “was made to him by mistake.”101 
This raises an interesting question as to whose mistake one should consider.  
Arguably the original misappropriator who published the information 
intended to do so, and thus did not do so by mistake.  On the other hand, the 
trade secret owner could argue that it was a mistake because he or she did 
not intend to disclose the trade secret.  It is also unclear from the 
Restatement’s definition whether “notice of the fact” that the information is 
secret is judged at the time the trade secret is discovered, or at a later time 
 
99 See note 29 supra.
100 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 16 U.L.A. 449.  
 The Rest. of Torts and Restatement of Unfair Competition definitions are consistent with the UTSA.   
 
101 Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (1939). 
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when the trade secret owner provides such notice to the defendant.  The 
cases seem to suggest the former.102 
It is worth considering whether the manner in which the third party 
obtained the information over the Internet is (or should be) “improper 
means.”  The phrase certainly captures unlawful conduct,103 but it has also 
been interpreted to cover lawful conduct.104 For the purposes of this 
problem, the assumption is that the third party is not a hacker and has 
merely accessed the information through a search engine or through another 
site to which she has legitimate access.  Accordingly, even given a broad 
interpretation of improper means, it would seem very unlikely that this kind 
of searching, in and of itself, would constitute improper means.105 The end 
result would appear to be that a defendant who does not know or have 
reason to know that the information is trade secret cannot be liable for 
misappropriation.  As one court reasoned: 
Although the person who originally posted a trade secret on 
the Internet may be liable for trade secret misappropriation, 
the party who merely downloads Internet information cannot 
 
102 See, e.g., Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 681 F.2d 161, 164 (3rd Cir. 1982) (noting that the 
defendant “had reason to know, and in fact knew, that the drawings were secret when he obtained them, and that 
their release to him was improper.”)  See also  discussion infra in section VIII (B)( 3) regarding notice.   
 
103 Improper means under the UTSA includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a 
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.  Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
§ 1 (1985). 
 
104 See, e.g., National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 35-36 (Mo. 1966). 
 
105 See RTC v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1369 (“It is the employment of improper means to procure the trade 
secret, rather than the mere copying or use, which is the basis of [liability]”). 
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be liable for misappropriation because there is no 
misconduct involved in interacting with the Internet.106 
It is noteworthy that for most courts the question whether there was 
misappropriation comes back to the preliminary consideration of whether 
the information qualifies as a trade secret. 107 This is perfectly logical, 
given that one cannot misappropriate that which is not a trade secret.  This 
observation helps inform the model presented in this paper, since the 
preliminary consideration of the protectable status of the information is 
inescapable.  However, once determined in the affirmative, it must be 
divorced from the other factors in order to avoid a tautology and permit a 
clearer, more distinct analysis of the issues.  
V. OTHER OBSTACLES TO TRADE SECRET PROTECTION   
In addition to the hurdles to preserving the trade secret status of 
arguably public information within trade secret law, there are further 
barriers from other areas of law that may also be implicated by the analysis.  
Both constitutional law and patent law concerns lean toward prohibiting 
restrictions on the use of publicly available information.  The applicable 
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Patent Law doctrines are 
summarized below. 
 
106 RTC v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 at 1368. 
 
107 See, e.g. Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 251 (“[I]f the allegedly proprietary information contained in 
DeCSS was already public knowledge when Bunner posted the program to this web site, Bunner could not be 
liable for misappropriation by republishing it because he would not have been disclosing a trade secret.”) 
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A.  First Amendment 
 
Defendants in these types of cases have asserted a First Amendment 
right to disclose allegedly trade secret information discovered on the 
Internet.108 “[T]he First Amendment generally prohibits limitations, absent 
some extraordinary showing of governmental interest, on the publication of 
information already made public.”109 When weighing the jealously guarded 
First Amendment rights against the commercial interests in protecting trade 
secrets, courts are often reluctant to enjoin disclosures of trade secrets.110 
By implication, it would seem that if the First Amendment always trumps 
an owner’s right to protect against disclosure, then trade secret law would 
be powerless to enforce non-disclosure agreements or otherwise prevent 
disclosure of their secret information.  Accordingly, the California Supreme 
Court has rejected a similar argument and made clear that an injunction 
against disclosure of information that qualifies as trade secret does not 
violate the First Amendment.111 
108 For further discussion about the First Amendment in this context see generally Ryan Lambrecht, Note: 
Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 Rev. Litig. 317 
(1999). 
 
109 Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 900 (Moreno, J., concurring). 
 
110 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996)(refusing to enjoin 
publication of trade secrets improperly obtained in violation of a protective order, noting, ‘[t]he private litigants’ 
interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest simply does not qualify as grounds for imposing 
a prior restraint.”) 
 
111 DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 889 (2003).   
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Nonetheless, the obvious hole remains: where a trade secret has 
been disclosed (and thus no longer qualifies as a trade secret under current 
trade secret law) the First Amendment could protect the disclosure.112 This 
returns full circle to the ever critical determination whether information, 
once posted on the Internet, loses its trade secret status.  A positive response 
to that question leads to the likely conclusion that the information, for a 
whole host of reasons, including the First Amendment, can be used freely.  
Furthermore, in the absence of a fiduciary duty or confidentiality 
agreement not to publish trade secret information, one court has ruled that 
the First Amendment prevails.  In Ford Motor Co. v. Lane,113 the defendant 
operated a website with news about Ford and its products.114 Lane received 
confidential Ford documents from an anonymous source, and initially 
agreed not to disclose most of the information.115 However, Lane 
eventually published some documents on his website relating to the quality 
of Ford’s products, thinking that the public had a right to know.116 He did 
so despite knowing that the documents were confidential.117 Ford sought a 
 
112 See id. at 876.
113 Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d  745 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
 
114 Id. at 747. 
 
115 Id. 
 
116 Id. 
 
117 Id. at 748. 
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restraining order to prevent publication of the documents, claiming the 
documents were trade secrets.118 The court acknowledged (without any 
discussion) that Ford could show Lane had misappropriated its trade secrets, 
but reversed the order on First Amendment grounds, considering an 
injunction to prevent Lane from publishing trade secrets a prior restraint.119 
Despite evidence that Lane had used the Internet and the confidential 
material to extort Ford, the court noted that Ford’s trade secrets were not 
more important than the documents in the Pentagon Papers case and not 
more inflammatory than the article in the Near case.120 Since a prior 
restraint was not justified in either of those cases, a prior restraint could not 
be justified in this case.121 
B.  Fourth Amendment 
 
Further constitutionally based obstacles to restricting use of publicly 
available information lies in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.   Some 
scholars have explored analogies between Fourth Amendment privacy 
interests and the secrecy requirement of trade secret law.122 As specifically 
 
118 Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 748. 
 
119 Id. at 750. 
 
120 Id. at 752-53 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822, 91 S. Ct. 
2140 (1971) and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931)). 
 
121 Id. at 753. 
 
122 See, e.g., Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law 
Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151, 1182-83 (1996); Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-
Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 461, 465-66 (1992).   
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related to the issues presented in this paper, however, a rule that trade 
secrets posted on the Internet lose their protection is consistent with and 
analogous to court interpretation of  Fourth Amendment privacy interests.  
In particular, when a person unlawfully invades one’s zone of privacy to 
steal private, incriminating information and then reveals that information to 
the police or the public, courts have held that this conduct does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.123 The fact that trade secret law similarly provides 
incentives to break the law, is thus not a unique concept.124 
C.  Patent Law 
 
Any attempts to restrict use of information found in the public 
domain are outside the purview of trade secret law, and instead are covered 
by patent law.  It is patent law that governs property rights in publicly 
known information.  The underlying premise is that “all ideas in general 
circulation [is] dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a 
valid patent.”125 Accordingly, attempts to use state trade secret law to 
 
123 See generally Rodney A. Smolia, Information As Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for 
Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1135-36 (2002)(discussing the “silver platter” doctrine which 
permits an independent agent to break the law to obtain incriminating evidence, and turn that evidence over to law 
enforcement on a “silver platter.”) 
 
124 Unlike the Fourth Amendment “silver platter” cases, however, which justify such incentives by 
arguing that the Fourth Amendment only proscribes government action, an analogous rationale in trade secret law 
is not as strongly supported. See id. at 1136. 
125 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at  481. 
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restrict use of information in the public domain are preempted by patent 
law.126 
Patent law further lends support to the idea that the intervening 
illegal act of a misappropriator could negatively affect the rights of the 
owner.   The two cases discussed below make clear that even when a 
misappropriator steals an invention while it is a trade secret, and then 
unbeknownst to the inventor, puts it on sale or uses it publicly one year 
before the inventor files a patent application on the invention, that use or 
sale prevents the inventor from obtaining a patent.   
In Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.,127 plaintiff Lorenz sued 
defendant Colgate for a declaration that Lorenz’s soap manufacture patent 
was valid and Colgate’s was void.128 Lorenz alleged that he disclosed the 
invention to Colgate, and that disclosure gave Lorenz priority over the 
invention.129 Colgate asserted that its use of the patented process more than 
a year before Lorenz filed the patent application rendered Lorenz’s patent 
invalid under prior public use.130 Lorenz in turn argued that prior use does 
 
126 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989) (“That which is 
published may be freely copied as a matter of federal right.”); Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 255 (“[T]hat which is 
in the public domain cannot be removed by action of the sates under the guise of trade secret protection.”) 
 
127 167 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1948). 
 
128 Id. at 423-24. 
 
129 Id. at 424. 
 
130 Id. 
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not apply when an invention is “pirated” by another person.131 However, 
the court held that the prior public use statute had no exceptions, and any 
intervening public use bars the inventor from obtaining a patent.132 The 
court stated that the policy behind the statute was to protect the public’s 
interest, and therefore it was up to the inventor to protect his discovery from 
being used.133 
In Evans Cooling Systems, Inc. v. General Motors,134 plaintiff Evans 
filed suit against defendant General Motors (“GM”) for infringing Evans’ 
patent on engine cooling.135 GM moved to declare the patent invalid on the 
basis that GM sold cars with the invention before Evans sought a patent, but 
Evans asserted that GM stole his engine cooling invention and allowed 
dealers to sell vehicles containing the invention, and GM therefore should 
not be able to invalidate the patent.136 After reviewing prior case law, the 
court concluded that since the public use by the dealers of the invention was 
innocent, the public bar use should apply.137 
131 Id. at 426. 
 
132 Id. at 429. 
 
133 Lorenz, 167 F.2d at 429. 
 
134 125 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 
135 Id. at 1450. 
 
136 Id. 
 
137 Id. at 1454.  However, the court noted that if GM did misappropriate the invention, Evans could still 
sue for misappropriation of trade secrets. Id. 
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VI. ASSISTANCE FROM ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE CASES 
Despite the seemingly uphill battle in trying to preserve the trade 
secret status of information disclosed on the Internet, one area of law 
provides some hope, even if only by analogy.  Cases involving inadvertent 
disclosure of materials protected by the attorney client privilege are in some 
ways analogous to the trade secret problem identified here.  As the 
summary below reveals, the courts tend to protect the privileged status of 
the information especially where the necessary precautions were taken and 
the disclosure occurred inadvertently or through misconduct.  Thus, even 
where confidentiality of the materials may have been lost, the privilege can 
be preserved.  Although there is no direct parallel to trade secret law in that 
once secrecy is lost, the trade secret status is also lost, the model presented 
here attempts to capture the spirit of those cases by recognizing that there 
may be certain exceptional circumstances where trade secret status may be 
retained.  
A.  In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley and Co 
 
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley and Co.,138 
Berkley moved to suppress some evidence stolen by a former employee 
 
138 466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979). 
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from a grand jury, asserting it was protected by attorney-client privilege.139 
The court initially held that attorney-client privilege historically does not 
apply to stolen or lost documents as a matter of law.140 On motion to 
reconsider, the court noted that the more modern approach is that when 
attorneys and clients take reasonable precautions to ensure confidentiality, 
the attorney-client privilege is not lost.141 Since the former Berkley 
employee stole the documents, the court held that the theft is analogous to 
an attorney disclosing privileged information in bad faith, which does not 
result in a loss of privileged status under modern precedent.142 
B.  Resolution Trust Corp. v. Clayton J. Dean143 
In this case the Washington Post published excerpts from an 
Authority to Sue Memorandum prepared by plaintiff Resolution Trust 
Corp.’s (“RTC”) counsel.144 When defendant Symington moved to order 
discovery of the memo, RTC asserted the attorney-client privilege.145 
Symington argued that the privilege was waived when it was leaked to the 
 
139 Id. at 865. 
 
140 Id. at 868 (citing 8 Wigmore on Evidence §  2325 (McNaughton rev.1961)). 
 
141 Id. at 869. 
 
142 Id. 
 
143 813 F. Supp. 1426 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
 
144 Id. at 1427. 
 
145 Id. at 1428. 
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newspaper unless RTC could prove it was stolen.146 Citing Berkley, the 
court rejected Symington’s argument, and noted that disclosure of the 
memo was a criminal act.147 The court held that since RTC proved they 
took precautions to ensure the memo’s confidentiality, they established that 
the release of the memo was not voluntary and that they did not waive the 
attorney-client privilege of the memo.148 
C.  C.P. Smith v. Armour Pharmaceuticals 
 
In C.P. Smith v. Armour Pharm.,149 defendant Miles, Inc. 
inadvertently included a document from in-house counsel in a document 
production given to plaintiff Smith.150 When Smith’s lawyer subsequently 
leaked the document to the press, and accounts of the document appeared in 
newspapers from Florida to Alaska, Miles filed a protective order, asserting 
attorney-client privilege to the documents.151 The court noted that wide 
circulation of a document is not, by itself, grounds for revoking attorney-
client privilege. 152 The court found a distinction between the document 
 
146 Id. 
 
147 Id. at 1429 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869-70 
(D. NM. 1979)). 
 
148 Resolution Trust Corp., 813 F. Supp. at 1429-30. 
 
149 838 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 
150 Id. at 1575. 
 
151 Id. 
 
152 Id. 
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losing its confidentiality and losing its privilege, stating that a document can 
retain its privilege even if it is no longer confidential.153 Even though the 
document was no longer confidential, since Miles did not waive the 
attorney-client privilege, the document still retained the privilege.154 
D.  United States ex rel. Jerry Mayman v. Martin Marietta155 
The government sought access to attorney-client privileged 
documents in this case via a discovery request, asserting that defendant 
Martin Marietta waived the privilege by allowing a former employee to 
possess a draft of the document.156 The court found that whoever gave the 
privileged documents to the former employee was not authorized to have 
them, the former employee was not authorized to keep them and made false 
statements to keep them.157 Since the confidentiality of the documents was 
breached due to the unauthorized actions of a former employee, the court 
refused to conclude reasonable precautions were not taken, and held the 
privilege was not waived.158 
153 Id. 
 
154 C.P. Smith, 838 F. Supp. at 1577. 
 
155 886 F. Supp. 1243 (D. My. 1995). 
 
156 Id. at 1244. 
 
157 Id. at 1245-46. 
 
158 Id. at 1246. 
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VII. THE  SEQUENTIAL PRESERVATION MODEL 
The complexity of the problem presented here lies not necessarily in 
the analytical framework of trade secret law available for determining 
whether information is deserving of trade secret protection.  Rather, it is the 
recognition of the injustice that could result from strict application of the 
law, and the ensuing incentives for illegal conduct, that is disturbing.  Given 
the equity rationale underlying trade secret law, these concerns compel an 
exploration for a more just result.  There is an underlying recognition that 
perhaps something more than a bright line rule may be appropriate in some 
cases.   
With that in mind, I propose what I will coin a sequential 
preservation model below as a tool to achieve a fairer result in those limited 
cases where the injustice would otherwise be especially grave.  When 
properly applied, the factors should provide relief in extraordinary 
circumstances.  For the vast majority of cases, however, the default rule 
under the current trade secret framework should apply.  Publication of trade 
secrets via the Internet will cause a loss of trade secret protection.  This may 
appear harsh in some circumstances, but trade secret owners have a duty to 
be vigilant, and having chosen this method of intellectual property 
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protection, they must be ready to face the possible disadvantages of the 
regime.159 
A prudent approach to addressing these types of cases requires 
deliberate and careful consideration of the many issues raised in the Article, 
including the rights of a trade secret owner to maintain the protection of his 
or her valued information versus the right of the public (and competitors) to 
use information found in the public domain.  The conduct leading to the 
disclosure does not necessarily change the analysis presented in this paper.  
Thus, disclosure which occurs as a result of an inadvertent disclosure by the 
trade secret owner or one of his/her agents, is treated in the same manner as 
a disclosure resulting from the criminal or other illegal conduct by an 
employee or third person.  Nonetheless, the model is informed by the 
various legal frameworks and theories discussed thus far in this paper.  
A.  Threshold Issue – Establish Trade Secret Status 
 
As a threshold matter, preliminary consideration must be given to 
determine whether the trade secret owner can reasonably establish160 that 
the information in question was entitled to trade secret protection before it 
 
159 As discussed earlier, supra  Section VII, the harshness of such a rule is not unique to trade secret law, 
and is supported by both constitutional and patent law principles. 
 
160 The standard utilized for this inquiry should be akin to the likelihood of success on the merits standard 
used in preliminary injunction cases.  Most trade secret cases, particularly in the context of the problem presented 
here, will be decided at a preliminary injunction hearing.  Thus, use of this standard should present no further 
difficulty, and may very well fold into the injunction test. 
 
27-Aug-06]  SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES 49 
was misappropriated on the Internet.  In particular, the most critical part of 
that inquiry should be whether the trade secret owner took reasonable steps 
to preserve the secrecy of the information.  This is consistent with the law 
and practice already required in trade secret misappropriation cases, as the 
trade secret owner bears the burden of establishing the trade secret status of 
the information.  Furthermore, the extent to which the allegedly trade secret 
information is available or has been disclosed through sources, other than 
the Internet, will also be relevant to determining trade secret status.161 
If the court determines that the trade secret owner is not likely to 
succeed in proving that the information was trade secret, then the bright line 
rule of trade secret disclosure should apply and the inquiry need not proceed 
any further.  That is, the trade secret owner is not entitled to enjoin use of 
the alleged trade secret information disclosed on the Internet.  As a practical 
matter, this is reasonable in light of the fact that failure to prove trade secret 
status is fatal to any claim for misappropriation, and is especially so where, 
as here, the action would involve an independent third party who accessed 
the information from the public domain. 
If a court determines that the information was deserving of trade 
secret status before it was allegedly misappropriated, then the next step is to 
 
161 See, e.g.,  RTC  v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1368 (noting that information was available in a public court 
file for twenty eight months in addition to having been posted on the Internet).  
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determine via the factors below whether, despite the disclosure, it has 
nonetheless retained its trade secret status.162 The choice to phrase the 
inquiry in terms of retention of status, rather than loss of status is deliberate, 
as it underscores the underlying expectation that retention of trade secret 
status after disclosure is the exception, not the rule.  Accordingly, it is 
expected that with rigorous application and weighing of these factors, only 
a very small number of cases would qualify for retention status.     
B.  The Three Factors 
 
Of the three factors identified below, the first two focus on the trade 
secret owner and the trade secret.  The first factor considers the time 
interval of trade secret exposure and whether the owner was sufficiently 
prompt in acting to save the trade secret after discovering the disclosure.  
The second factor looks at whether the trade secret has essentially entered 
the public domain as a result of the disclosure.  In light of the equitable 
considerations underlying trade secret law, however, it also seems fair to 
introduce a third factor which considers the recipient’s good faith.  This 
factor will specifically answer whether the independent third party has 
misappropriated the trade secret and therefore should be enjoined.  This 
inquiry is entirely consistent with the definition of misappropriation which 
 
162 This is consistent with some courts finding that accidental disclosures may not lead to loss of trade 
secret protection.   See, e.g., Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., No. SA-01-CA-646-OG, 2004 WL 2359420, at *32 
(W.D. Tex. July 14, 2004);   B.C. Ziegler and Co. v. Ehren, 141 Wis. 2d 19, 30-31 (Wis. App. 1987); see also  
Rest.3d Unfair Competition, § 39, com. f, p. 431. 
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includes consideration of the recipient’s knowledge that the information is 
another’s trade secret.163 The factors ought to be evaluated sequentially, at 
least to the extent that the first two must be considered before the third.   
1. Time and Action  
 
This first factor would require consideration of the amount of time 
that the information was exposed on the Internet, and the promptness of any 
action by the trade secret owner to have the information removed.  In sum, 
more favorable consideration will be given to (a) information that has been 
posted for a very short period of time (24-48 hours) and (b) where the 
owner discovered the publication and took action immediately (within 24-
48 hours) to have it removed. By analogy, given the importance of trade 
secrets to a business, this factor expects the trade secret owner to treat 
discovery of a disclosure similar to what one would expect of a parent who 
discovers a child may be missing.  
In light of the threat to trade secrets posed by the Internet, trade 
secret owners have an obligation to monitor the Internet for potential 
wrongful disclosures.  Were there any question of the existence of this 
obligation, the examination of the issues in this Article leaves no doubt that 
such must be the case.  In deciding to choose trade secret protection over 
 
163 This reasoning is also similar to the tipper/tippee theory of liability in insider trading which extends 
liability to tippees who trade based on inside information received from a misappropriator,  providing that the 
tippee knows or has reason to know the tipper breached a duty of trust and confidence.  See SEC Rule 10(b)(5). 
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other options to protect intellectual property (e.g. patent law) a trade secret 
owner undertakes this responsibility as part of the bundle of disadvantages 
associated with trade secret protection.  
The amount of time of exposure and promptness of action which 
will be considered sufficient will depend on the circumstances.  However, 
the rate at which information moves through the Internet, dictates that the 
promptness measure be correspondingly rapid.  Information that has been 
posted for more than approximately twenty-four to forty-eight hours is 
much more likely to have become “generally known” and thus not meet the 
test for trade secret protection. 
A trade secret owner who discovers the information must respond 
immediately and can show that it took prompt action by, for instance, filing 
a lawsuit, seeking an emergency temporary injunction, contacting the 
Internet service provider to have the information removed,164 or sending a 
cease and desist letter.165 While this is not an exclusive list, the goal is to 
separate those who have “slept on their rights” upon discovering the 
 
164 The tools currently in place for addressing removals from websites are not satisfactory given the 
special concerns posed in these kinds of cases.  If trade secret owners are to bear the burden of acting swiftly to 
remove trade secrets from websites, then it is incumbent upon our legal system to provide the appropriate efficient 
and effective mechanisms to do so.  A mechanism akin to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor 
provisions for Internet service providers who post copyright protected materials is a useful starting point.  17 
U.S.C. § 512 (1999).  The author plans to address this topic in a separate forthcoming paper.   
 
165 The appropriate strategy must be carefully tailored in light of the circumstances.  See Victoria A. 
Cundiff, Trade Secrets and The Internet: Preventing The Internet From Being An Instrument of Destruction, 842 
PLI/PAT 347, 355-59 (2005) (discussing considerations in litigating to remove trade secrets from the Internet).   
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potentially fatal disclosure, from those who have acted consistent with the 
danger that has befallen their business.  This requirement also implicitly 
provides corroborative evidence of the true value of the trade secret the 
business.  
2. Extent of Disclosure 
 
The second factor considers the extent of the disclosure.  This 
includes not only how much of the trade secret was disclosed, but is also 
related to the first factor in trying to ascertain the nature of the site on which 
the information was posted (public availability).  It attempts to address the 
necessary element, whether the secret became “generally known or 
knowable.”  It further permits exploration of the premise that “[p]ublication 
on the Internet does not necessarily destroy the secret if the publication is 
sufficiently obscure or transient or otherwise limited so that it does not 
become generally known to the relevant people, i.e., potential competitors 
or other persons to whom the information would have some economic 
value.”166 
This factor evaluates the specific site on which the information was 
posted.  A more prominent disclosure on a highly visited web page might 
require more prompt action, and greater concern, than a disclosure in an 
 
166 Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 252. 
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obscure, members-only chat room, with limited membership.  If the 
information was published on a network with controlled access to a specific 
membership, particularly where the membership is a small, well-defined, 
and finite group, weighs in favor of the trade secret owner.  If, however, the 
group consists of precisely the relevant people who would most benefit 
from the information, then it may be more difficult to argue that the trade 
secret has not become “generally known.”  One further advantage to a 
closed network is that their identities are known, and it might be easier to 
obtain injunctive relief against them.167 
The amount of secret information that was disclosed may also be 
probative of whether the information deserves to retain its trade secret 
status.  In circumstances where only portions of the trade secret were 
disclosed, and the remaining undisclosed portions continue to maintain their 
competitive value to the trade secret owner, then a court could find that the 
trade secret protection has not been completely lost.168 
This examination of the extent of the disclosure is supported by non-
Internet related cases that require something more than mere public 
accessibility of the trade secret, namely publication, before finding loss of 
 
167 See  Ryan Lambrecht,  Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist For Disclosure in The 
Information Age? 18 Rev. Litig. 317, 338 (1999).  
 
168 See  Smokenders, Inc. v. Smoke No More, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q. 309, 317 (S. D. Fla.); Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  
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the protection.  For instance, in cases addressing unsealed filing of trade 
secret information in public court records, evidence of further publication of 
the trade secret is required to destroy trade secret protection.169 Admittedly, 
the nature of the Internet is such that, unlike a public court file in a court 
house, publication to the relevant public can be virtually instantaneous, and, 
as such, there is a significantly smaller window of opportunity for the trade 
secret owner to protect the secret status of the information.  Nonetheless, 
this factor allows for a thoughtful assessment of the extent of exposure by a 
court, rather than a presumption that the disclosure (particularly in isolation) 
destroyed the secret.  
 
3. Recipient’s Reason to Know the Information was Trade Secret 
 
This final factor turns from the trade secret owner’s actions to the 
recipient’s state of mind and is an important part of the definition of 
misappropriation.  Related to the first factor, if the trade secret owner 
provided notice to the recipient in a timely fashion that the information was 
trade secret, then the acquisition by “improper means” may be a stronger 
case.  Furthermore, if the evidence independently suggests that the recipient 
 
169 See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 418-19 (4th Cir. 1999)(discussing 
cases dealing with disclosure of trade secrets in court files);  see also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., 
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 849 (10th Cir. 1993).   
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knew or should have known the trade secret status of the information then it 
will weigh in favor of the trade secret owner.   
Under the UTSA one is liable for misappropriation if “he obtains 
information from a third person and then discloses or uses it knowing, or 
possessing information from which he should know, at the time of 
disclosure or use that the information is a trade secret and that it had been 
misappropriated by the third person.”170 The defendant’s knowledge that 
the information was trade secret is also evidence of misappropriation under 
the Restatement of Torts as well.171 Circumstantial evidence can be 
weighed to determine the likelihood that the defendant knew the acquisition 
was wrongful, and a defendant cannot shield himself by “studious ignorance 
of pertinent ‘warning’ facts.”172 Defendant’s constructive notice that the 
information was trade secret is sufficient.173 The Restatement’s definition 
of notice provides guidance: 
One has notice of facts . . . when he knows of them or when 
he should know of them . . . . He should know of them if, 
from the information which he has, a reasonable man would 
infer the facts in question, or if, under the circumstances, a 
 
170 IMED Corp. v Systems Engineering Associates Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992) (interpreting 
state version of the UTSA). 
 
171 See id. at 347; see also section II (B)(1) supra. 
 
172 Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., Inc., 381 Mass. 1, 6 (1980) (citations 
omitted). 
 
173 See C&F Packing Co., Inc. v. IBP, Inc. and Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 93C1601, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3221, at *18 (N. D. Ill.  March 16, 1998). 
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reasonable man would be put on inquiry and an inquiry 
pursued with reasonable intelligence and diligence would 
disclose the facts.174 
Accordingly, if the evidence suggests that a reasonable person would have 
been on notice175 that the information received was the wrongfully 
disclosed trade secret of another, then the defendant should be liable for 
misappropriation.176 
Even though the burden of proof remains with the trade secret owner 
to prove defendant’s guilty state of mind, it will be important for the 
defendant to marshal facts to effectively prove a negative in defense; that 
she did not have reason to know the information was trade secret.  In doing 
so, she may rely on the argument that the trade secret, through its posting, 
had become generally available.  In expressing that position, it is important 
to try to avoid the tautological reasoning that has befallen some courts, i.e. 
whether the information was trade secret in the first place.177 Thus, the line 
between the defendant’s state of mind and the generally availability of the 
information, may become blurred in the analysis.  As one court noted, for 
instance: 
 
174 Restatement of Torts § 757, Comment 1 (1939). 
 
175 This generally refers to notice at the time of the disclosure.  However, notice from the trade secret 
owner after the initial disclosure may also suffice. See C&F Packing Co., Inc. v. IBP, Inc. and Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 
93C1601, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3221, at *17 (N. D. Ill.  March 16, 1998). 
 
176 See C&F Packing Co., Inc. v. IBP, Inc. and Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 93C1601, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3221, at *18 (N. D. Ill.  March 16, 1998). 
 
177 See, e.g., Bunner, 116 Cal. App.  4th at 253 (suggesting that knowledge about the unethical origin of 
the information is insufficient to prevent use of information that has become publicly available). 
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In a case that receives widespread publicity, just about 
anyone who becomes aware of the contested information 
would also know that it was allegedly created by improper 
means. . . in such a case the general public could 
theoretically be liable for misappropriation simply by 
disclosing it to someone else.  This is not what trade secret 
law is designed to do.178 
One value of this model and the factors presented here is that the question 
whether information qualifies as a trade secret, would have already been 
answered positively as a threshold matter. Thus, at this point in the model, 
an analysis of the facts supporting the defendant’s state of mind would be 
separate from that question.179 Evidence of the defendant’s state of mind 
relative to the trade secret status of the information will also depend on the 
particular circumstances, and would consider any bad faith on the part of 
the defendant.  A defendant could also present any First Amendment or 
other defenses at this juncture.   
 Evidence of the trade secret owner’s proactive steps or prior 
relationship with the defendant may also bear on the defendant’s bad faith 
or culpable knowledge.  Materials which are clearly labeled and stamped 
indicating that they are confidential, proprietary or trade secret will be 
helpful.180 Evidence that this particular defendant has previously tried, 
 
178 Bunner, 116 Cal. App.  4th at 253. 
 
179 This knowledge requirement is consistent with the criminal claim for theft of trade secrets found in the 
Economic Espionage Act, which requires that the defendant knowingly stole or otherwise obtained the trade secret 
information.  See 18 USCA § 1832. 
 
180 See, e.g., O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 WL 1452685 at *3 (Cal. App. May 
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legitimately or illegitimately, to obtain the trade secret from the owner may 
also be relevant.  Attempts to extort benefits from the trade secret owner in 
exchange for returning the materials would also signal culpability.181 
Finally, evidence that the defendant knew the trade secrets were obtained in 
violation of a confidentiality agreement, license agreement, or a fiduciary 
obligation weighs in favor of the plaintiff.182 
If someone other than the original misappropriator posted the 
information (and is the first to do so), then she, as the publisher, ought to be 
in a worse position than the independent third party who discovers the 
posting.183 That person or entity is likely to fall within a conspiracy type 
analysis, for obtaining the secret from the misappropriator with knowledge 
of the wrongful acquisition.184 Having received the information directly 
 
26, 2006) (noting that electronic slides were “conspicuously marked as ‘Apple Need-to-Know Confidential.’”). 
 
181 See, e.g.  Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747, 753 (E. D. Mich. 1999) (defendant 
threatened to publish “disturbing” materials about plaintiff on his website, and to solicit trade secrets from 
plaintiff’s employees). 
 
182 See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 873 (2003) (discussing that trade 
secrets were obtained through reverse engineering in violation of license agreement, and that defendants knew of 
this improper means of acquiring the trade secret). 
 
183 This would encompass owners and operators of web sites who make decisions about what materials to 
publish on their sites.  Analogous to their traditional media counterparts, editors and reports of newspapers and 
magazines for instance, they could be liable to the trade secret owner and subject to an injunction.  This is an 
unsettled area of the law, however, and the argument espoused here appears to be novel.  See generally O’Grady,  
2006 WL 1452685 at *22 (reasoning that operators of web sites are “publishers”); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514 (2001) (addressing whether the media may be liable for using information unlawfully obtained by a 
third party); MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON, LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA LAW CASES 
AND MATERIALS 536-547 (7th ed. 2005).   
 
But see Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E. D. Mich. 1999) (refusing to enjoin 
publication where no fiduciary duty or confidentiality agreement exists);  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust 
Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996)(refusing to enjoin publication of trade secrets improperly obtained in 
violation of a protective order). 
 
184 See Lockridge., 209 Kan. at 393. 
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from the original misappropriator, or an associate/agent, and then deciding 
to post it carries, at the very least, a taint of misappropriation.185 Posting the 
information does not purge that taint, and precludes the poster, like the 
original misappropriator, from claiming that the information has now 
become generally known and is not a trade secret.186 
VIII. SUMMARY AND APPLICATION OF THE SEQUENTIAL PRESERVATION 
MODEL 
To more clearly illustrate the connection between the components of 
the model and their theoretical underpinnings, I present the summary below.    
In the subsection that follows I then work through some of the case 
examples to illustrate application of the model.  
A.  Theoretical Checklist  of the Model 
 
A court faced with an Internet disclosure problem can utilize this 
model (in conjunction with application of the preliminary injunction 
 
185 Cf. RTC  v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 at 1369 (“Because there is no evidence that The Post abused any 
confidence, committed and impropriety, violated any court order or committed any other improper act in 
gathering information from the court file or down loading information form the Internet, there is no possible 
liability for The Post in its acquisition of the information.”) 
 
Some Supreme Court cases also support the proposition that the conduct of a publisher may be taken 
into consideration in deciding whether to grant First Amendment protection.  See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. 
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 
186 See Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“Once a secret 
is out, the rest of the world may well have a right to copy it at will; but this should not protect the misappropriator 
or his privies.”); see also Lockridge v. Tweco Products, Inc., 209 Kan. 389, 393 (1972)(“We do not believe that a 
misappropriator or his privies can ‘baptize’ their  wrongful actions by general publication of the secret.”) 
cf. Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2005)(Where FDA had posted 
plaintiff’s trade secrets on its website without authorization, it could still be liable for misappropriation even 
though the trade secrets had been publicly available on the website for five months). 
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standard)187 to determine whether the trade secret status of the information 
has been preserved and whether to enjoin an independent third party.  One 
value of this process is that it provides for deliberate consideration of the 
trade secret law requirements, avoiding automatic and potentially erroneous 
assumptions on a case by case basis. 
A.  Was the disclosed information deserving of trade secret 
protection before it was posted on the Internet?  This is 
the threshold determination.    If no, then there is no need 
to apply the model: there cannot be misappropriation and 
an injunction cannot issue. If yes, then proceed to the 
rest of the model. 
B. Did the information retain its trade secret status despite 
the Internet posting? To answer this question, apply the 
first two factors to the facts of the case. If the answer is 
no, do not proceed further and end the analysis.  There 
cannot be misappropriation or an injunction for that 
which is not a trade secret.  If the answer is yes, then 
proceed to the final step. 
C. Was there misappropriation by the defendant 
independent third party? To answer this question, apply 
the third factor regarding the defendant’s state of mind.  
If the answer is yes, then an injunction should issue; 
otherwise, there is no trade secret liability and an 
injunction is not appropriate. 
 
187 See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe,  When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable 
Disclosure Doctrine,  7 Tul. J. Technology. & Intell. Prop. 167, 201-07 (2005)(discussing implications of seeking 
injunctive relief in a misappropriation case). 
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B.  Application with Case Examples 
 
The case examples below illustrate the impact of the various phases 
of the model.  For ease of reference I use the cases that have already been 
discussed in the Article, and which also happen to be among the main cases 
of relevance in this area.  Relying on the facts as reported in the respective 
opinions is limiting in so far as we are bound by the context and posture of 
the case as it originally presented.  Taken together, however, they are 
nonetheless useful for illustrating various aspects of the model. In some 
instances the original outcome of the case is consistent with the outcome 
that would have been achieved using the model.  That may very well be 
because of the court’s attempt to reach an equitable result, rather than a 
more principled reasoning process, such as that offered by the model.   
1. Religious Technology Center v. Lerma 
 
This case likely fails the threshold part of the model because the 
information arguably lost its trade secret protection even before Lerma 
posted it on the Internet (and thus well before the Post obtained it).  That is 
mostly because the documents were present in an open court file for about 
twenty-eight months prior to Lerma’s  Internet publication,188 signifying a 
failure to protect the secret status of the information.  The court could have 
been persuaded, however, by the Church’s argument that the appearance in 
 
188 See Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1368.  
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the court file was beyond its control and despite its best efforts.  Indeed, not 
only had the Church filed a motion seeking that the court seal the file,189 but 
after denial of that motion it took the extraordinary precaution of having a 
church member check out the court file every day to prevent others from 
seeing it.190 
Even if a court were swayed by that argument, and the analysis 
moved to the second part of the model, it would certainly fail at this stage.  
In considering the first two factors of the model, the fatal blow would be 
dealt by the fact that before the Post acquired the information for its story, 
the documents had been posted on the Internet (by Lerma) for more than ten 
days191 (exceeding the 24-48 hour guideline suggested in the model), on a 
publicly available website and would thus be generally known.  
Accordingly, the model would direct that the trade secret status of the 
information had not been preserved.  The court’s holding that the Post’s 
actions did not constitute misappropriation is consistent with the outcome 
under the model. 
 
189 908 F. Supp. at 1364.   
 
190 Id.  at 1365. 
 
191 Id. at 1368. 
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2. DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner 
 
Whether the disclosed information in this case was deserving of 
trade secret protection before it was posted on the Internet by Bunner, is a 
question that the court ought to have addressed in greater detail.192 The 
precise information that the plaintiff claimed as a trade secret was DeCSS, 
which had not in fact been created by it, but through reverse engineering.193 
Because a person may lawfully reverse engineer another’s trade secrets,194 
and given that the defendants in this case had not themselves reverse 
engineered the plaintiff’s code, it is highly questionable that the DeCSS 
should have been entitled to trade secret protection.195 Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that by the time Bunner posted the code on his website, it 
had already been “distributed to a worldwide audience of millions.”196 
Accordingly, a rigorous analysis under the model would have failed the 
threshold.   
 
192 In one sentence, the court notes that “[w]e have only very thin circumstantial evidence of  when, 
where, or how [the reverse engineering] actually happened or whether an enforceable contract prohibiting reverse 
engineering was ever formed.”  116 Cal. App. 4th at 253.  
 
193 Id. at 246.   
 
194 See  section II(A) supra. 
195 The plaintiff claimed that the reverse engineering occurred in breach of a license agreement.  Id. 
Nevertheless, under the facts of the case the presence of a trade secret is dubious.  See also, Pamela Samuelson, 
Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment (Aug. 9, 2006 draft) 
(discussing use of mass market licenses to override the reverse engineering privilege of trade secret law).  
 
196 116 Cal. App. 4th at 252.  
 
27-Aug-06]  SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES 65 
Since the court assumed, however, that the reverse engineered code 
was entitled to trade secret protection, then the analysis would proceed to 
the second part of the model.  It took DVD CCA approximately two months 
to file legal action against Bunner, after discovering his posting.197 Such 
delayed action would not survive the prompt action required under the 
model.  Further crippling the plaintiff at this stage is that the level of the 
disclosure was extensive: “by the time [the] lawsuit was filed hundreds of 
Web sites had posted the program, enabling untold numbers of persons to 
download it and use it.”198 Consequently, there was no preservation and no 
trade secret to misappropriate.  The court’s denial of an injunction fits the 
model.199 
3. O’Grady v. Superior Court 
 
Although the focus of this case was on resolving a discovery 
dispute200 rather than deciding a trade secret misappropriation case, the facts 
provide a useful illustration for the model.  The case presents some thorny 
issues, the implications of which are worth wrestling with under the model, 
 
197 Id. at 255. 
 
198 Id.
199 Under the reasoning stemming from the model, the defendant’s First Amendment defense would not 
have been reached, because there would be no need to invoke the third part of the model (which would have 
considered defendant’s state of mind and defenses). 
 
200 Petitioners in the case sought a protective order to prevent Apple Computer, Inc. from discovering the 
identities of anonymous persons who had provided allegedly trade secret information to them about Apple’s 
plan’s to release a new product.  See 2006 WL 1452685 at * 5.  The petitioners posted the information on their 
web sites. Id. at *3.   
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even if only at the margins.  More specifically, unlike the other cases 
discussed in this section, here, the third party, O’Grady, did not obtain the 
alleged trade secrets from an Internet posting, but rather was the first to post 
the information on the Internet after having obtained it elsewhere. 
The less challenging part of the analysis is that the threshold 
determination is more easily met here than in the two prior cases.  Apple 
Computer Inc.’s (Apple) plans to release a new product would likely qualify 
for trade secret protection before it was posted by O’Grady and/or sent to 
him by e-mail.  Some of the information was derived from an Apple 
electronic presentation clearly labeled “Apple Need-to-Know Confidential,” 
and Apple would have demonstrated that it “undertakes rigorous and 
extensive measures to safeguard information about its unreleased 
products.”201 Apple was further prepared to show that the information 
“could have been obtained only through a breach of an Apple 
confidentiality agreement.”202 Given all of these indicia of steps to protect 
the secrecy of the information and of its competitive value to the company, 
the threshold requirement would be satisfied.203 
201 Id. at * 3. 
 
202 Id. at *4.   
 
203 The court here, in the context of its First Amendment analysis and while distinguishing Bunner,
suggests that certain types of information are more worthy of trade secret protection than others.  In particular, the 
court mentions that the kind of information at issue here (plans to release a product) may not rise to the same level 
as technical information about how to create the product.  Id. at * 36.  While that kind of reasoning might be of  
some (albeit limited) merit in a First Amendment analysis of newsworthiness (see id. at *37), it is not appropriate 
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At this point the retention analysis becomes complicated.  O’Grady 
does not fit the third party who finds the trade secret on the Internet mold 
because he allegedly received the trade secret information via e-mail from 
Apple insiders. 204 Accordingly, the underlying principles supporting the 
model would suggest that we bypass the question of retention and proceed 
to the misappropriation inquiry.205 In analyzing O’Grady’s state of mind 
and reason to know that the information was trade secret, a court should 
weigh such factors as the “taint” associated with his having received (and 
perhaps solicited) the trade secrets from Apple insiders against him.206 As a 
publisher, however, he would be entitled to raise his First Amendment 
defense and the newsworthiness of the disclosure, and ultimately may 
prevail. 
 
for determining whether information is entitled to trade secret protection in the first instance.  The UTSA and 
other applicable trade secret frameworks already provide the criteria for such determinations, and those ought to 
be sufficient.  There is no sliding scale: either something is a trade secret or it is not.  As even the O’Grady court 
has expressed in reference to information that is worthy of publication, “courts must be extremely wary about 
declaring what information is worthy of [trade secret protection] and what information is not” because to do 
otherwise would undermine trade secret law.  
 
204 See id. at *11. 
 
205 Although e-mails involve use of the Internet, they generally do not rise to the same level as Internet 
postings for the purposes of the analyses presented in this paper.  Because they are typically directed to a 
relatively small number of people or a finite group, e-mails do not generally have the instant mass dissemination 
quality of an Internet posting on a publicly available web site.  (I recognize, however, that spam e-mails and the 
ability of recipients to forward e-mails to others in virtually unlimited fashion, could be problematic.  Thus, in the 
event a trade secret is disseminated in this fashion the analysis may be affected).  Accordingly, the likelihood of 
the information having entered the public domain and lost its trade secret status is not as strong when transmitted 
by e-mail (see sections IV-VI supra).  As a result, the theoretical framework would more closely resemble non-
third party Internet cases and proceed to the misappropriation finding, once the trade secret owner has established 
key elements such as value and secrecy. 
 
206 See  notes 184-187 and accompanying text supra.
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Finally, permit me to indulge in one more modification in order to 
create a true third party Internet disclosure scenario and engage in a 
retention analysis under the model.  Assume that an Apple competitor 
discovered the product release plans from O’Grady’s postings, and Apple 
files a misappropriation action against the competitor.  The facts of the case 
would suggest that the trade secret would not be preserved.   
The retention inquiry would focus on Apple’s reaction to O’Grady’s 
postings, and the nature of those postings.  O’Grady’s articles about the new 
product ran on five separate days, and Apple’s first “cease and desist” 
contact to O’Grady came nineteen days after the first article appeared.207 It 
took five more days after that to file the complaint.208 While this may have 
been relatively prompt action for a plaintiff merely seeking to identify the 
sources of a breach of confidentiality, it is not enough for one seeking to 
prevent information from becoming generally known to the relevant public.  
The fact that O’Grady’s web site was “devoted to news and information 
about Apple Macintosh computers” leaves little doubt that the trade secret 
reached the relevant people.209 
207 See id. at *1 -*3.   
 
208 Id. at *3.  
 
209 Id. at *1. 
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The nature and amount of information disclosed would also weigh 
against Apple.  To the extent it claims its plan to release this particular 
product as a trade secret in order to control “timing and publicity for its 
product launches,”210 then O’Grady’s articles stole its thunder and  there 
was nothing left of the secret to preserve. The trade secret would therefore 
be lost, and the competitor would be entitled to use it.211 
4. United States v. Genovese 
 
As a result of its procedural posture and context, this case does not 
provide sufficient relevant details to work through each sequence of the 
model.212 It does, however, provide a useful illustration for the third part of 
the model, and as such, I will make certain assumptions and draw 
inferences where the voids exist.  First among those assumptions is that the 
Microsoft source code was a trade secret before it was posted on the 
Internet.  Genovese himself “acknowledged that the source code was 
proprietary to Microsoft and that someone else penetrated whatever 
safeguards Microsoft enlisted to protect it.”213 
210 Id. at * 3. 
 
211 Assuming, arguendo, that Apple had acted within twenty-four hours of the first article to stem further 
publication about the new product, then there may have been a better chance of preserving the secret.  In keeping 
with the court’s reasoning, O’Grady’s First Amendment arguments in the final part of the model, however, may 
have saved him from a misappropriation finding.  
 
212 It is a ruling on a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment under the Economic Espionage Act.  See 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11947, at *1.      
 
213 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11947, at *13. 
 
27-Aug-06]  SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES 70 
The are essentially no facts with which to determine whether the 
source code retained its trade secret protection by the time Genovese found 
it on the Internet.214 I will, therefore, assume that the facts (similar to the 
hypothetical presented at the beginning of the paper) would show that 
Microsoft acted with the requisite promptness to stem the dissemination of 
the code, and that the extent of the disclosure was minimal,215 thereby 
preserving the trade secret status of the information.   
Finally, we would arrive at the misappropriation stage of the model 
and examine Genovese’s reason to know that the source code was a 
Microsoft trade secret, and the presence of any bad faith.  On that point, the 
evidence exists and weighs in favor of Microsoft.  The court notes that 
Genovese (a) describes the code as “jacked,”216 (b) indicates that others 
would have to “look hard” to find it elsewhere, (c) was on notice that 
Microsoft had not publicly released the code, and (d) offers the code for sale 
and successfully sells it because of its relative obscurity.217 It is also highly 
unlikely that he would succeed on a First Amendment defense, given that he 
 
214 Id. at *10-11.  The opinion does not indicate, for instance, the web site from which he downloaded the 
code, how long it appeared on the site, what action (if any) Microsoft undertook to remove the information from 
that site, and with what degree of promptness.   
 
215 In attempting to sell the source code, Genovese indicated that “others would have to ‘look hard’ to find 
it elsewhere.” Id. at *10. 
 
216 An abbreviation for “hijacked,” which the court interpreted to mean “stolen” or “misappropriated.” 
U.S. v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 
217 Id. 
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was behaving more as a salesman than a reporter.  Accordingly, this would 
present an appropriate case for an injunction.  
 
IX. REMEDIES 
A court, finding misappropriation after hearing the facts and 
weighing the factors presented above should issue an injunction.218 The 
scope of that injunction will vary depending on the particular 
circumstances.219 Removal of the information from the web site (if it has 
not already occurred) would certainly be necessary.220 A court could further 
enjoin the recipient from using the information, at least for a certain period 
of time.  While this does not erase the information from the hands of a 
competitor, it could at least mitigate some of the damage by delaying use of 
the information in a manner that would allow the defendant to compete 
unfairly with the trade secret owner.221 The injunction should also prohibit 
the defendant, and his/her agents, from further disseminating the 
information. 
 
218 Where the defendant has made use of the trade secret, a court could also order monetary damages in 
addition to an injunction.  See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.02[B] (4th ed. 
2005). 
 
219 The three types of injunctions in trade secret cases are 1) prohibitions against disclosure or use, 2) 
sanctions against engagement in competitive employment, and 3) bans on the manufacture of products in which 
the trade secret is an essential ingredient. Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 10.5 (3), at 694-95 (2d ed. 1993). 
 
220 Note that a “cached” version of information may continue to reside in search engines even after the 
information has been removed from an active page.  Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and The Internet:  
Preventing The Internet From Being An Instrument of Destruction, 842 PLI/PAT 347, 351 (2005).   
 
221 See DVD v. Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241, 253-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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A more difficult problem for the trade secret owner, however, would 
be that other members of the public, other than those named in the suit, 
could not be enjoined from using the information.222 Because law and 
public policy favor the unfettered use of information in the public domain, 
and courts likely lack jurisdiction to enjoin non-parties in a law suit, the 
trade secret owner’s prospects for containing use of the information are 
bleak.223 
A trade secret owner can pursue a misappropriation claim against 
the original misappropriator (if known), and may also have claims against 
those who aid and abetted the misappropriation.  Thus, to the extent the 
information was posted by someone other than the original misappropriator, 
that person may also be liable.  Even if the misappropriator may have 
succeeded in destroying the trade secret status of the information vis a vis 
others, trade secret law does not permit him or her to benefit from use of the 
information.224 Thus, for instance, such a person is not entitled to claim 
immunity on the basis that the information is no longer secret.  Assuming, 
 
222 See U.S. v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1998)(“A district court may not enjoin non-
parties who are neither acting in concert with the enjoined party nor are in the capacity of agents, employees, 
officers, etc. of the enjoined party.”) (citations omitted); see also Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. 
v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 
223 See Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at  254 (noting that an injunction is inappropriate where the information 
is no longer secret). 
 
A trade secret owner may consider turning to other areas of law for relief or to criminal prosecution.  
Depending on the nature of the trade secret information, copyright laws, for instance might be an alternative 
avenue. 
 
224 See Lockridge,  209 Kan. at 393 . 
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as is often the case, that the misappropriator does not have deep pockets, 
however, a victory against him may be hollow and unsatisfying for a trade 
secret owner who now suffers the permanent loss of its trade secret.225 
Given the current status of the law, it becomes clear that a trade 
secret owner’s best and most effective weapon is protection of the trade 
secret information to prevent disclosure in the first place.226 This requires 
absolute vigilance and knowledge of potential threats, among the most 
dangerous of these being the Internet.  In the event that a disclosure is made 
despite best efforts, prompt action in addressing the situation is critical.227 
Since trade secret owners have the legal burden of proving the trade secret 
status of their information when they seek to enforce protection, it is 
incumbent upon them to be mindful of that burden long before litigation 
arises.  Otherwise, it may be too late once the milk has been spilled. 
 
225 See Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at  254. 
 
226 Trade secret owners can step such proactive steps as entering into clear and specific non-disclosure  
agreements with employees and other authorized persons, limiting disclosure of information to a need-to-know 
basis, clearly marking documents as confidential and trade secret, and monitoring employees.  See generally 
Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 
Tul. J. Technology. & Intell. Prop. 167, 192 n. 171 (2005); Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and The Internet:  
Preventing The Internet From Being An Instrument of Destruction, 842 PLI/PAT 347, 353-54 (2005).   
 
227 This is consistent with some courts finding that accidental disclosures may not lead to loss of trade 
secret protection.   See, e.g., Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., No. SA-01-CA-646-OG, 2004 WL 2359420, at *32 
(W.D. Tex. July 14, 2004);   B.C. Ziegler and Co. v. Ehren, 141 Wis. 2d 19, 30-31 (Wis. App. 1987); see also  
Rest.3d Unfair Competition, § 39, com. f, p. 431. In light of the unique potentially destructive power of the 
Internet, trade secret owners should also be provided with the necessary legal tools and resources with which to 
exercise their duty of vigilance and to facilitate removal of trade secret information that has been posted, or where 
posting is imminent.  In that regard, legislative action may be necessary to ensure that the laws that regulate the 
Internet and Internet providers incorporate considerations of the danger the Internet poses to trade secrets and 
more generally, businesses.  
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X. CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this Article I presented the hypothetical involving  
Soft Corporation.  Where a trade secret, such as the source code for a 
program, is stolen from its owner and posted on the Internet, the default rule 
would be that it becomes a free for all.  By virtue of the fact that it has been 
posted, it becomes public, and consequently loses its trade secret protection.  
The ensuing result is that independent third parties, including competitors, 
are entitled to use it, and the trade secret owner, despite years of laudable 
efforts to maintain the secret, suffers a fatal loss at the hands of a 
wrongdoer.  The apparent injustice in that conclusion does not go 
unnoticed.   
Given that trade secret law is intended to regulate the moral and 
ethical pulse of competitive commercial behavior, this Article set out to 
explore the problem presented by trade secret Internet disclosures, and to 
identify whether at least in some circumstances it may be possible to retain 
trade secret status after a disclosure.  Review of the various legal theories 
supports the general rule that trade secret status is lost upon disclosure.  
Nevertheless, considering the equitable and doctrinal considerations 
underlying trade secret law, and drawing from analogous attorney client 
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privilege cases, there is support for an argument that trade secret status may 
be saved in some circumstances.  
Accordingly, I presented a model, comprised of three factors, which 
may be used as a guide to decide which cases qualify for this exception.  
The model is drawn from and supported by the various legal issues 
surrounding the problem.  While, in reality, it may only save a small 
number of cases from the general rule, its value lies in its use as an 
instrument that may be applied by courts to yield consistent results.  It 
provides an avenue to work within the existing constraints of trade secret 
law to hopefully achieve more just results in compelling cases.  It illustrates 
that “[t]he Internet, as a mode of communication and a system of 
information delivery is new, but the rules governing the protection of 
property rights, and how that protection may be enforced under the new 
technology, need not be.”228 
228 Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 912-913 (Cal. App. Ct.  2001). 
